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BARRIERS TO SAFETY INNOVATION:
EXPERIENCES APPLYING THE “SAFETY MODEL BASED ANALYSIS” APPROACH
IN EUROPEAN AVIATION
Kyla Steele1
Dédale - Paris, France
Foundation for an Industrial Safety Culture - Toulouse, France
Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers, Laboratoire d’Ergonomie - Paris, France
Jean Pariès
Dédale - Paris, France
Safety research during the past decade has increasingly emphasized the importance of understanding both positive
and negative aspects of performance, rather than errors, risks, and accidents alone. As the aviation industry already
enjoys such a low accident rate, safety managers are looking for predictive approaches in order to proactively
monitor system behaviour. Expectations of the scope and complexity of models has also increased, trying to keep
pace with the rapid evolution of the industry, and a systems view has now become the aspiration. A riskmanagement approach called the Safety Model Based Analysis (SaMBA) developed by Dédale attempts to meet
these modern objectives. This paper describes and discusses the various challenges Dédale encountered during two
attempts to apply SaMBA2 at different organizations, only one of which was successful. The factors were manifold,
among them certain challenges specific to safety interventions which raise questions about the industry’s capacity
for safety innovation.
The basic principles behind the SaMBA approach are
only described as required to give the necessary
context (the approach is described in Bieder & Pariès
2003 and Pariès & Bieder 2003). The purpose of this
paper is to describe the challenges Dédale encountered
during the large-scale trials. Thus the discussion will
focus on the factors which appeared to facilitate or
hinder the success of implementing the SaMBA safety
analysis method into the industrial workplace.

Introduction
An approach called the Safety Model Based Analysis
(SaMBA) developed by researchers at Dédale is an
attempt to meet the needs of today’s safety
practitioners. SaMBA is a practical risk-management
tool based on a predictive safety model. This analysis
method creates and employs a “safety architecture” to
capture a global view of how safety is created and
maintained within a process or activity (e.g. a flight
or a maintenance operation). The top-down safety
model provides a picture of how the system is
intended to be safe, which is used as a framework to
make sense of bottom-up event data from daily
operations. The comparison of empirical events with
the safety architecture enables the maintenance of the
model so that it stays relevant and informative,
providing a way of monitoring practical drift towards
the boundaries of safe practice.

Closing the learning loop
Dédale is currently conducting a review of the
facilitators and barriers to the application of SaMBA
for the HILAS (Human Integration into the Lifecycle
of Aviation Systems) project to ensure the smoothest
possible implementation of any new tools and
methods. The results and conclusions discussed here
are based on interviews with Dédale staff only; the
perspectives of the industrial partners will be
discussed separately.

SaMBA was developed over the past 8 years through
a series of projects involving range of European
commercial aviation activities: airline maintenance,
aircraft manufacturing, air traffic management, civil
aviation regulation, and accident investigation. The
concept and principles were developed based on
industry needs exposed during the earlier projects.
Then two large-scale projects were conducted where
a full version of the method was to be implemented
to support operational safety management.
1
2

The retrospective observations of the participants
themselves do not constitute ‘hard scientific
evidence’; nonetheless, there is value in the exercise
of reflection and evaluation. It also provides feedback
to the aviation safety community and initiates the
opportunity to exchange ideas on the topic. In the
hopes that the experiences and lessons-learned
through these cases are externally valid, they have
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In case #2 the application of SaMBA was in the context
of a European research project. As the company had an
existing need for the tool, the timing was less of an issue
and the political and economic context was more
favourable to putting SaMBA into practice.

been generalized beyond their original context. This
paper comprises a brief description of the attempted
safety intervention and the features of the tool, the
organizations, and the industry, which may have
acted as barriers or facilitators to the change. There is
more emphasis on hypothesized barriers which are
specific to safety innovation, since understanding
these problems is the first step towards solving them.

Table 1. Comparing surface features of the cases

Changing safety management in the ‘real world’

Goal

Two very different cases

Scope

The large-scale attempts to implement SaMBA
differed in a variety of ways. Examples of the
differences which appear relevant (at least in
hindsight) to the outcome of the projects are briefly
outlined in Table 1.

Org. Size
Org.
Features
Human
Resources
Timing

First of all, there was a fundamental difference
between the objectives of the different organizations:
in one case SaMBA was intended to fill an existing
need, in the other improve an existing risk
management system. The case where SaMBA was
not adopted was a larger, more mature organisation
with very high ambitions of using the approach
throughout the entire company for the full range of
their activities. This would have required significant
restructuring of the company’s safety management,
information flow, and decision-making. The financial
implications were within the means of the
organization but nevertheless significant.

Context

Case #1
Unsuccessful
Improve/replace
existing system
All-encompassing
Large
Mature
No appropriate
position existed
Out of synch with
work plan
Consulting project

Case #2
Successful
Create new system
Limited to one
activity
Small
Undergoing change
Dedicated taskowner existed
Newly created need
Research project
(partially funded)

Necessary but not sufficient?
While the circumstances of the cases illustrate some
barriers to organizational change which may be
common sense and are already well treated in
management literature, it is not realistic to limit
safety improvement efforts to small organizations or
business units conveniently experiencing a phase of
transition, etc. This would mean ignoring the players
with the largest contributions to the industry.

The company in the second case was much smaller
and only wanted to adopt the approach for a
relatively independent sub-unit, so the objectives
were on a much more limited scale. This sub-unit
was already undergoing changes at the time due to
new regulatory requirements, resulting in extra
flexibility. This company already had the appropriate
personnel in a position to spear-head the change and
act as process-owners, whereas the organization in
case #1 needed to reassign their human resources to
support the initiative.

The challenges faced in case #1 are daunting but not
insurmountable if the organisation is sufficiently
motivated. The fact that the company already had a
well-established, compliant safety and risk
management operation meant that there was no
compelling, easily demonstrable need. In aviation,
the rule-of-thumb is “if it’s not broken, don’t fix it”
since the system is very complex and tightly coupled
so any change can have multiple, far-reaching, and
sometimes unanticipated consequences. It is prudent,
therefore, not to make any changes unless the
benefits are clear and unequivocal. There were
internal stakeholders in case #1 who were convinced
of the need for this change and the enormous
potential benefit, but the onus was on them (and
Dédale) to demonstrate a convincing case, that the
benefits would justify potential negative effects.

The original plan, in case #1, was that SaMBA would
be implemented during a period of reorganization,
there were slips in the schedule which resulted in it
being too late to realize this. The role of external
consultant in this first case brought with it the typical
political paradox where the advice of outsiders may
be considered by some employees as a helpful voice,
more likely to be heard by decision-makers, while
others may view it as unnecessary or inappropriate
interference, possibly even resenting the implication
that outside expertise is required.

Digging for deeper explanations
The surface features of the cases notwithstanding;
Dédale hypothesizes three reasons for the lack of
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underlying assumptions about safety is further
complicated due to the fact that they are rarely made
explicit and they have likely been the status quo for
decades. The system perspective taken by SaMBA is
fundamentally at odds with the status quo in fact,
thus accepting the new implies rejecting the old. This
potentially creates cognitive tension and even
defensive responses in individuals with a stake in the
traditional approach.

success which specifically address the characteristics
of safety management in aviation: (a) An unavoidable
conflict of interest for those who should have been
spearheading the project caused internal resistance; (b)
The legal and legislative framework discourages
organizations from exceeding the minimum safety
requirements; (c) the fragmented structure of the
industry means that some safety needs are structurally
separate from the means to fulfill them, and the
ambiguous commercial value of ‘safety’ does not
naturally yield a supply-demand paradigm in response.

Both of these structural and semantic adjustments put
existing safety personnel in an uncomfortable
position, and it is only natural for individuals to resist
the change. These sources of individual resistance are
covered in the management and sociology literature
and it is not the objective of this paper to repeat that
in detail.

Conflict of interest
SaMBA integrates operational event data within the
framework of a top-down safety architecture and
highlights areas where the empirical data contradicts
the theoretical safety model. It proposes ways of
working, ways of thinking, information flows,
decision-making, and organization of safety
management activities which differ from the
traditional approaches. SaMBA is a “revolution
rather than an evolution” (Swuste & Arnoldy, 2003,
p. 19), requiring major structural and paradigmatic
changes. This is likely to be traumatic for any mature
or traditional organization.

Since it is these safety personnel critical to effecting
the change who are likely to feel the most threatened,
there is a conflict of interest. During the unsuccessful
case, Dédale personnel claim to have seen evidence
that people were threatened by these changes. The
resulting conflict apparently created vigorous
opposition to SaMBA in favour of the status quo or
some other, less ‘revolutionary’ approach.

The SaMBA method relies heavily on the active
engagement of employees throughout the organization,
particularly operators and decision-makers. The flow
of information is completely reorganized and becomes
more direct, which breaks down the structural barriers
between sub-units. The ‘health status’ of the system is
rendered transparent so that everyone can see and
understand it. In short, returning to the principle that
“safety is everybody’s job”.

Be careful what you wish for
One of the key challenges facing safety researchers
and practitioners is how to create a sense of urgency
and reduce uncertainty about the need to act before
an event or incident has occurred – in other words,
how to create a proactive approach. One of the
principle objectives of SaMBA is to make potential
problems salient and unambiguous, in part through
the creation of a more realistic picture of the gap
between theory (what people say they do) and
practice (what people do) but this creates a legal
dilemma for the company since changes require
resources and resources are limited. SaMBA is meant
to support the prioritization of safety concerns,
however, the company still much make choices.

If there is an existing safety department, they will no
longer act as the main conduit for certain types of
safety information. They must transfer some of their
responsibility and decision-making capacity to other
departments, and as a result their role will be
redefined. This does not imply that safety managers,
risk analysts, or incident investigators are less
important or out of a job, quite the contrary: as a
major safety initiative it is imperative that these
groups take on principal roles.

Although it is becoming gradually more acceptable to
admit that procedures are not perfect and not all rules
can be followed all of the time, there is still very little
room for this grey area amid the blacks and whites of
litigious Western society (Dekker, 2005). People are
understandably fearful and reluctant to abandon the
normative paradigm, at least when in comes to
official company policy and written documentation.
There is still little alternative available to
management and regulators, “accountability” remains
the name of the game.

Implementing and using SaMBA requires the
adoption of a non-traditional perspective of safety
and risk. SaMBA attempts to consider the system as
more of an ecological whole: The method involves
describing a priori how the system maintains its
functions,
rather
than
‘calculating’
safety
quantitatively based on aggregations of component
reliability and risk probability. Confronting the
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And what of the even less tangible, cooperative
endeavours, such as incident reporting systems? The
airline may want to give feedback to a manufacturer so
that they will improve the quality of their technology
or procedures. These improvements would benefit
both the airline and the manufacturer (presumably they
would have increased sales), so who should cover the
costs of running the reporting system?

So with increased knowledge comes the burden of
increased (legal) responsibility. A method like
SaMBA which makes the system’s vulnerabilities
more visible and compelling (and leaves a permanent
written trace) is a mixed blessing given the realities
of the modern judicial context (Anderson, 2004;
Nørbjerg, n.d.) and intense commercial pressure.
Along a similar vein, organizations required to
demonstrate that they are ‘safe’ according to a rigid
regulatory definition may also balk at tools which
provide “too much of a good thing”.

While these are oversimplified examples of an
extremely complex subject, the bottom line is that at
industry level there exist both safety needs and the
means to meet these needs, but these may not be
collocated within the same organization. Thus one
party may shoulder the (short-term) cost while the
other enjoys the (long-term) benefits, and the
ambiguous commercial value of safety means that no
mutually satisfactory supply-demand framework
emerges. In fact, it may be the inverse: a tendency
towards the “tragedy of the commons” approach to
safety (Ostrom (1990) in Woods, 2006, p. 303 and in
Senge, 1990, p. 397). The main mediator is the
regulator, however this does not fully replace the
potential synergy of cooperation.

Structural divisions and supply vs. demand
If it does not pay to exceed the minimum
requirements in the case of regulatory and judicial
matters, then this may be even more true from an
economic standpoint.
The SaMBA approach takes the process or activity as
its unit of analysis so organizational boundaries are
irrelevant. Speaking from an ecological perspective,
the aviation system could be considered as a whole and
in that case it seems illogical that the industry (design,
manufacture, operation, training, maintenance, and
infrastructure of air transport technology systems) does
not share safety objectives or a model of successful
performance, or even communicate easily and openly
about safety concerns. This is not surprising, however,
considering the commercially and structurally divisive
configuration of the industry. Not only is the system
not fully cooperative (although there are certainly
exceptions), the industry is so fragmented that it is not
rare to find that the inter-organizational relationship is
adversarial. The intangible nature of “safety” is likely
the main reason for this unfortunate situation.

The experiences of Dédale confirm the claims of
management literature: a clear understanding of the
needs and benefits of the change is a key component
for success. This does not bode well, then, for
meeting the safety needs of a fragmented industry.
Conclusion
Factors influencing the success of making a new safety
approach operational include the structural and semantic
characteristics of the tool, the fit of the tool with the
needs of the user, the commitment of the user to the
cause, and the economic, political, and legislative
environment. SMEs (subject matter experts) and
academics are retained for research and consulting
projects because of their expertise of the subject, thus
important practicalities such as usability and
organizational resistance run the risk of being neglected.

Take the simple example of an airline and an aircraft
manufacturer: suppose that an airline must choose
whether to purchase one of two aircraft, each roughly
equivalent from a technical standpoint. The airline
could expect to experience fewer operational
problems (which has both safety and economic
implications) if they purchase the aircraft which has a
superior HCI and human factors design concept. The
manufacturer knows what these design features cost
to realize, and could be expected to charge a higher
price, but the airline may not have any way to
ascertain the monetary value of this investment. The
costs are immediate and always visible but traditional
safety measures (i.e. lack of accidents or incidents)
are based on very long-term statistics and are not
easily seen or quantified; Cost-benefit analyses do
not lend themselves readily to calculations of the
economic savings of not having an accident.

The creators of SaMBA recognized that developing
the idea is only the first in a series of hurdles, but
even when such matters are given sufficient attention
success is not guaranteed. The organizational and
industry-level barriers to innovation and change may
be beyond the control of the individual researcher or
safety department.
Some of the barriers described in this paper are not
completely novel, however the fact remains that
organizations and consultants often do not learn from
the past. According to change management literature
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the overwhelming majority of organizational changes
do not achieve their objectives (Pfeffer & Suttion,
2000). The aviation system is mature and becoming
increasingly standardized on a global scale, thus the
limitations on innovation caused by organizational
stiffness (Amalberti, 2006) and characteristics unique
to aviation safety are increasingly apparent.
If there is any hope of making progress there must be
a clear statement of the problem in order to unify
aviation’s global safety goals. This is the first step
along a cooperative path towards a commercial
regulatory environment in which organizations are
not discouraged from surpassing the minimum safety
standards and are free of the restrictions on safety
innovations imposed by the current judicial and
financially strained operational context.
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